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The principal case is entirely barren of evidence of misconduct
on the part of the wife subsequent to the husband's leaving, and the
court was unwilling to say, as a matter of law, that the period elapsing between that date and the date of the birth of the child was
so far excessive as to conclusively show illegitimacy. The court
refused by its judgment to brand an innocent child with the bar
sinister unless the evidence was so conclusive as to leave room for
no other course.
M.T.

EMINENT DOMAIN-REAL PROPERTY-TAKING OF PROPERTY
BY CONTINUOUS FLIGHT OF AIRCRAFT.-On May 11, 1942, the

United States Government entered into a lease with the GreensboroHigh Point Municipal Airport Authority whereby the United States
was to lease ten acres of land adjoining the airport property. The
lease began on June 1, 1942, and was to terminate at the expiration
of thirty days, but with a privilege of renewal given until June 30,
1967, or until six months after the end of the present national emergency whichever first occurred.
The northwest-southeast runway of the airport is located about
2,000 feet from respondents' property. To reach this particular runway, the petitioners' planes, of necessity, flew directly over the respondents' domain at a height of less than 100 feet. The height at
which the planes flew over the property in question, was in accordance
with the 30 to 1 safe glide angle 1 approved by the Civil Aeronautics
Authority. The frequency with which the northwest-southeast runway was used was determined by the wind direction and velocity so
that it was used approximately four percent of the time in taking off
and seven percent of the time in landing. The proof shows, however,
that large numbers of planes flew frequently over the respondents'
property causing considerable loss in the operation of their chicken
farm. Production of chickens was materially lessened because of the
distraction at night occasioned by the noise and bright glare of the
planes in passing. Fatality among the chickens ran high as, in terror,
they dashed themselves to death against the side of the barn.
The respondents had previously brought an action in the Court
of Claims, 2 and were awarded damages in the amount of $2,000. The
award was based on the reasoning that the frequent and regular
passage of Army and Navy aircraft over the property of the respondents at low altitudes, constituted a taking of said property within
the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. The case came to the Supreme
2 A 30 to 1 glide angle means one foot of elevation or descent for every
30 feet of horizontal distance.
2 Causby v. United States, - Ct. C. -, 60 F. Supp. 751 (1945).
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Court on a writ of certiorari. Held, judgment of Court of Claims reversed. Although the United States Government had taken to itself
an easement of flight, there was no precise description as to its nature.
In fine, it was not described in terms of frequency of flight, permissible altitude, or type of airplane. Nor was there a finding as to
whether the easement taken was temporary or permanent. An accurate description of property taken is essential since that interest vests
in the United States. United States v. Causby, - U. S. -, 90 L. ed.
971 (1946).
The frequent passage of planes at a low altitude over respondents' property constituted a taking of said property as complete as
though the United States had entered upon the surface of the land
and had taken exclusive possession of it. A trespass upon the property of another does not, ordinarily, constitute a taking; but if the
trespass be a continuing one, or if the intention is shown that the
trespass will continue at will, the inference must necessarily be that
we have a taking within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. 4 But
the common law concept of cujus est solumn ejus est usque ad coelm
et ad inferos, has been considerably modified. The exigencies of modem civilization have caused a practical application to be made of this
doctrine. The view now is that the land owner owns the air chamber
above and the minerals below only so far as it is necessary for the
full and complete enjoyment of the land itself. Were this ownership
to be otherwise construed, then passage through the sky from city
to city would subject the operator to innumerable suits. The public
interest will not permit this result.
The United States' defense was predicated on the Air Commerce
Act of 1926, 5 as amended by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938.6
Under these statutes, the United States has ". . . complete and exclusive national sovereignty in the air space.. ." over this country.7
By the aforementioned statutes, there is granted to any citizen of the
United States ". . . a public right of freedom of transit in air commerce through the navigable air space of the United States." 8 Navigable air space is defined as ". . . air space above the minimum
safe altitudes of flight prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics Authority, . . . "9 It is, therefore, the position of the United States
3 But see dissenting opinions of Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Burton.

4 Portsmouth Co. v. United States, 260 U. S. 327, 329, 67 L. ed. 287, 289
(1922) (where Mr. Justice Holmes, delivering the opinion of the court, said:
"But even when the intent thus to make use of the claimants' property is not
admitted, while a single act may not be enough, a continuance of them in
sufficient number and for a sufficient time may prove it. Every successive
trespass adds to the force of the evidence.").
544 STAT. 568 (1926), 49 U. S. C. §171 (1940).
652 STAT.
752 STAT.

852

STAT.

973 (1938), 49 U. S. C. §401 (1940).
1028 (1938), 49 U. S. C. § 176(a) (1940).
980 (1938), 49 U3. S. C, §403 (1940).

944 STAT. 568 (1926), 49 U. S. C. §180 (1940).
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that the damage suffered by respondents is merely incidental and
that recovery should consequently be denied. 10 This position is not
tenable, for if the government had taken an easement of flight over
the land of the respondents, and this easement were permanent, then
it follows as a natural consequence that the easement would be the
equivalent of a fee interest. It would be construed as constituting
complete dominion and control over the land.
In the instant case, as in Portsmouth Co. v. United States," the
damages were not merely consequential in nature. They resulted
from a direct invasion of the respondents' domain. As pointed out in
United States v. Cress,12 ".... it is the character of the invasion, not
the amount of damage resulting from it, so long as the damage is
substantial, that determines the question whether it is a taking."
Although the meaning of "property" as this term is used in the Fifth
Amendment is a federal question,

".

.

. it will normally obtain its

content by reference to local law." 13 According to North Carolina
law, sovereignty in the air space rests in the state "except where
granted to and assumed by the United States." '4 The flight of aircraft over land is considered lawful unless deemed to be an interference with the beneficial use thereof. Here there was such interference and the Courts' view was that the specific facts would seem
to warrant the conclusion that there had been a servitude imposed
upon the respondents' land.
The question herein presented has novel aspects and has not
heretofore been directly passed upon. Mr. Justice Douglas in delivering the opinion of the Court refers to the case as one of "first
impression." The decision will probably lead to additional legislation by Congress on the subject of air travel in view of its ever
increasing importance and complexity.
I.L.

INSURANcE -CoNTRACTs
-RIGHT
OF BENEFICIARY TO SUE
AFTER PERIOD OF LIMITATION IN POLIcY.-The defendant company

issued to Jules B. Selden two policies of accident insurance; in one
of them the beneficiary was Selden's mother, in the other his estate.
He died on December 31, 1941, from a gunshot wound. The policies provided that affirmative proof of loss must be furnished to
the company within ninety days after the date of such loss. Proof
1o Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U. S. 546, 58 L. ed. 1088
(1914).
1"-260 U. S. 327, 67 L. ed. 287 (1922).
12 243 U. S. 316, 328, 61 L. ed. 746, 753 (1916).
'1 United States ex rel. T. V. A. v. Powelson, 319 U. S. 266, 279, 87 L. ed.

1390, 1400 (1942).

14 GEN. STATS. 1943,

§ 63-11.

